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PRODUCT SEMANTICS; 
A TRIANGULATION AND FOUR DESIGN THEORIES. 
by Klaus Krippendorff 
1 will start out by saying a few words on product semantics 
generally , what it is for those involved and what we hope to accomplish 
with it. Specifically , 1 want to trianaulate oroduct semantics in its 
emoirical domain. in its philosophv and in its methQdoloqv before 
commenting briefly on the theories the title promises. 
1 am compelled to proceed that way because , 1 believe , all 
designers are naturally attracted to anything new but many of them end 
up merely flipping through magazine pages for pretty pictures and 
largely ignore what is being said about their why. Pictures undoubtedly 
have their fascination , but they can also be misleading. For example , 
when the word "product semantics" came into use in 1984 , coincidentally 
the year of George Orwell's famous novel. Some saw in it a more 
acceptable word for the discredited "styling." Some welcomed it as a 
license , after years of austerity , for a more playful use of product 
forms , permitting visual metaphors , similies and allegories heretofore 
banned. Some considered it an invitation to apply graphics and 
。rnamentation to the surfaces of otherwise anonymous (traditionally 
grey , beige or black) boxes , regardless of what they contained. Others , 
particularly in the business world , embraced it as a way of adding a new 
kind of value to a product that promised to increase sales or improve 
the manipulation of consumer satisfaction , rendering product semantics 
as a kind of visual "double soea}<;." 1 can assure you , these are mere 
epiphenomena of our intentions. 
2 
To me , such interpretations of product semantics demonstrate the 
unfortunate tendency of old minds to adopt new words but otherwise cling 
to established practices. To dress provocative ideas into old clothes 
is a way of neutralizing their challenges. 1 am sure this conference 
will not be falling into such a trap for its symposia and workshops are 
conceived to carefully examine and practice what is new , to communicate 
an appreciation of the problems posed , and to invite participants t。
share in the new perspective product semantics offers for design. 
But after this brief digression let me talk about the empirical 
domain of product semantics. 
Empirical Domain 
since popular misconceptions of product semant~cs seem so much tied 
to the treatment of surfaces , the creation of semiotic envelops for 
products , the application of graphics , etc. , let me take the bull by its 
horns and try to answer the--as it turns out not so simple--question 
”What is a surface that we mav know it , what could it mean?" 
Naive semioticians contend that objects are established 섣요호깐략I 
E브X등후드를 and what we see of them is a reflection of light on their 
surfaces. 
Fìgure 1 
In contrast , signs and syrobols are thought to be established 섣X 
c。nventionê ， what they mean is what they refer to or what they stand for 
。ther than themselves. 1 happen not to believe in this dualistic world 
construction and my interest in language owes more to the later 
Wittgenstein and Austin than to these semioticians. But a better reason 
for rejecting referential or representational notions of meanings in 
design is that they inevitably lead to various pathologies. For 
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example , if symbols are conceived of as standing for something other 
than themselves , designing symbolic qualities of technical devices would 
have to divert users ’ attention to other things , to something possibly 
more desirable than what it actually is. A telephone in the form of a 
duck decoy is an extreme example , the addition of fake controls to a 
boombox is a more common one. The referential notion of meaning invites 
producers to make consumers believe to have bought something they did 
not and helps creating a make-believe world of fake facades. 80 , my 
first recommendation is to discard representational meanings altogether. 
But back to the question of what a surface is , how meaning relates 
to it. Consider walking on a beach. We feel the sand between our toes 
and several inches beneath our feet and soon come to see properties we 
could not see before we stepped on--or shouldn't we ’ say in--that beach: 
the softness , the warmth , the sound it makes walking. What may have 
first appeared to be a reflection from the yellow spectrum of the 
sunlight has now become meaningful and alive. Consider looking int。
(not onto) someone ’ s face. Even without knowing much about the network 
。 f blood vessels , muscles and glandular functions operating beneath it , 
we soon learn to see smiles , frowns , tears and emotional expressions as 
reflections of what we believe goes on in someones' mind. Consider 
sitting in front of a new computer. As we play with it , perhaps 
motivated by mere curiosity , we see changes emerging on its screen. We 
begin to understand the connection between our actions and what we see 
and , if this exploration is sufficiently engaging , we become 
increasingly able to make all the things happen we want to see and thus 
develop a deeper understanding of how our computer cooperates with us. 
Just as we are hardly pleased to see a human face without a skin , for 
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。rdinary computer users , understanding does not invo1ve wires , chips , 
arithmetic units and e1ectronic rays that activate images on the screen , 
but it does not stop at its visua1 boundary either. ~nderstandina 
s。methina oenetrates deep into its interi。~， makes what can be seen 
meaningfu1 , transparent , 1ive1y , if not a friend , and does this a11 in 
the user's own categories of cognition and 1anguage , not by its 
designers intentions. 
Indeed , we never see the 1ight that hits our retina much 1ess a 
surface but what that means to us. The form of an artifact , its 
ref1ecting surfaces , may be what a camera responds to , but for us as 
human users , it a1ways a1ready is interpreted by having a name , by 
having a recognizab1e history of use , by being composed of other things 
。r by being ab1e to support a practice of 1iving. ff the meaning 。f an 
。bject is not c1ear for us , we may fee1 invited to exp10re or p1ay with 
it unti1 it is , unti1 we have acquired a practica1 understanding. Thus , 
the meaning of something does not 1ie on its surface. It emerges in 
use , with practice , the practice of 1iving with our environment and in 
particu1ar contexts whenever we cognitive1y connect our actions and 
perceptions in an experientia1 circ1e of use. The meaninas thus 
c。nstructed suooort our oractice of 1ivina bv oenetratinq a surface as 
deeo as our understandinq qoes and bv invo1vinq as much of our coqnition 
as oarticioates in interaction with it. 
Fìgure 2 
Whi1e a11 design cou1d be regarded as an intervention in our 
practices of 1iving , 1 am suggesting that Rroduct semantics be concerneq 
with human interface~ ， i.e. with that 1ayer of cognition in which we 
experience how we interact with our environment , that 1ayer of cognition 
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which renders things understandable , meaningful , transparent , alive and 
useable or that layer of cognition which centers us in our own 
experiential world. Product semantics resides where human cognition and 
machine logic fuses into practice. 
Let me go further and argue that ynderstandinq and oractice are 
inseoarable twins and the understandinq of somethinq alwavs is the kev 
t。 its oractical us~. For example , we might never again run through the 
sand on a beach after we have been cut by glass hidden beneath its 
surface (in fact we might then be seeing glass everywhere even though 
there may not be any). We might be confused and not know how to talk t。
a person whose face is uninterpretable or exhibits weird expressions. 
Experiencing our own lack of understanding someone else's face might 
ι 
make us extremely uncomfortable and want us to leave a conversation. 
Faced with a computer with its near inexhaustible variety of possible 
uses , we always understand something to begin with. But then , we tend 
to press only the keys we can interpret , apply only programs we know 
something about or rely on routines that are familiar to us. The vast 
majority of the remaining possibilities might challenge a few hackers 
but mostly stays in the dark of incomprehension. Anything must be 
recognized for what it is and at least somewhat understood before it can 
enter a practice and , since there may be many different understandings , 
anything may be used in as many different ways as it can afford. T。
speak of "the function" of a product ignores the primacy of 
understanding and practice in favour of a strange objectivism. 
1 am finally suggesting that Rroduct semantics seek to understand 
users ’ understandinq of theiLPractices of interfacinq with desiqned 
6 
후흐후끄g흐 and provide strateqies for desiqninq products that can either 
afford or supportivelv intervene in that understandin。.
In other words , product semantics should be concerned not with the 
forms , surfaces and visual or tactile boundaries of artifacts (the 
things that can be photographed and shown in design exhibits) , but with 
the understanding that penetrates them. Product semantics should be 
concerned not with material objects as such , but with how they 
participate in human affairs , how they support understanding and 
practice. Product semantics should optimize not performance , as 
measured by outside criteria , but meaningfulness , motivation and the 
centeredness of humans in their own world and by their own criteria. 
Underlvinq Philosophv 
” with the understanding of meaningful practices of living at its 
core , product semantics joins several disciplines in the sciences and in 
the humanities in a major paradigm shift toward moving human cognition 
into the center of their attention. In the philosophy of science , the 
。ld preoccupation with ontology , the discipline concerned with what 
exists independent of its observation , is giving way to epistemology , 
the discipline concerned with how we know (n으호 how we know 쁘인효호)， and 
hermeneutics , the discipline of interpretation. The early behaviorism 
in the social sciences with its preference for causal explanations , its 
stimulus-response theories and its disdain for concepts of mind is 
increasingly superseded by a new cognitivism , an effort to understand 
how thinking and behaving are woven into communications and into the 
fabric of society. Cybernetics too is undergoing a major transformation 
from what is now called first-order cybernetics , the cybernetics of 
7 
。bserved systems , to second-order cybernetics , the cybernetics of 
。bservation.
To me , ergonomics , the discipline concerned with optimizing systems 
performance by applying objectively measurable criteria to the people 
involved , exemplifies the old paradigm. It reduces the human 
participants to machine-like operators but , because they always develop 
their own understanding and cannot be motivated entirely from the 
。utside ， ergonomists find human operators flawed with so many 
unreliabilities and defects that they must spend much of their effort t。
limit what their "errors" could do to the system as a whole. This 
approach is demeaning of human capabilities and perhaps symtomatic of 
。ld attitudes in design. 
In contrast , product semantics starts from the other end , from how 
people understand their own practice and why they engage in what they 
do. Product semantics recognizes that Reoole surround themselves with 
thinas thev are familiar with. are able to handle flawlesslv and can 
arranae so as to feel comfortable amonq them. For examples , we drive 
expensive cars though cheaper ones would transport us as well. We are 
willing to live in disfunctional furniture as long as we like it. We 
even buy computers we don ’ t really need but enjoy playing with. Such 
motivations are not rational and determinable by objective criteria but 
symbolic and derived from within individual understanding. 
Product semantics presumes that Reoole do best where thev see the 
。。ssibilitv of develooinq their own comoetencies. We don ’ t like to be 
trained to do a job others judge us by , but we are eager to learn by 
doing something exciting , acquiring knowledge while exploring , 
rearranging or even designing our own environment in our own terms 
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(guess why designers are so self-moti、rated!). By designing devices of 
specialized functionality for use by others , desi연ners have usurped much 
。f the excitement users could themselves enjoy in everyday life. The 
rise of intelligent machines enables product semantics to give much of 
this excitement back to individual users. 
Product semantics presumes 2eople never are unreliable bv choice 
but by being forced to use things that are designed in ignorance of how 
they understand or are accustomed to use them. Moreover , we don't like 
having to expend an enormous amount of energy to adapt to the 
requirements of badly designed machines for the ultimate reward it 
promises , we want a machine to be easily identifiable for what it is , 
understandable in its operation and possibly adaptive to our own way of 
doing things. ];rrors in use laraelv arise out of aιmismatch of what a 
machine can actuallv do and what it svmbolizes to a user to be capable 
으￡브으후ng. Product semantics seeks to reduce this mismatch by suggesting 
self-evident and understandable interfaces. It is thus no longer our 
problem to logically derive a physical form from an analysis of what 
something should do but to design something that makes sense to users , 
that affords (accommodates) a possibly large range of cognitive models 
users bring to its sight. Hence the slogan: 
Desian is makina sense of thinas. 
To appreciate the contrast created by this paradigm shift , consider 
the following , perhaps a bit overdrawn , comparisons between the old and 
a new philosophy in design , spearheaded by product semantics as I see 
it. 
Figure 3 
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Figure 3 
9 
Methodoloqv 
As intervention into the practices of living , design must (1) start 
with some appreciation of existing practices , (2) be able to anticipate 
the consequences of introducing improved or new artifacts , and (3) have 
a systematic (professionally acceptable) way of realizing or embodying 
designers ’ intentions. These tasks define three classes of methods that 
are quite common to all design activities but need to be developed for 
product semantics to succeed in its mission. 
The first is descriotiv~ ， is an effort to find out what exists and 
calls for research into people's understanding of things , the cognitive 
compentencies in use and brought to bear on anything new , the symbolic 
qualities of familiar objects easily recognized in everyday life. The 
ι 
most useful approaches to such research questions are found in 
ethnography , discourse analysis and perception experiments. 
Fthnoaraohic methodê are particularly suited to describe in appropriate 
details existing uses of things , cultural habits and practices and their 
distributions in a population. Participant observation , video recording 
and to a limited extend interviewing provide typical sources of 
ethnographic data. 
(Linguistic) giscourse analvsiê probably is indispensable in gaining an 
understanding of why and how people do what they do. The verbal 
accounts users can provide about their own practices , whether in the 
form of protocols or verbal instructions given to others , often 
constitute the only window into people ’ s world constructions and the 
cognitive models they employ to handle concrete situations. 
perceotion exoerimentê can reveal how forms , configurations or movements 
are mapped into language or acted upon in concert with culturally 
10 
established practices , thus going to the heart of the symbolic qualities 
。f things. The largely overused semantic differential scales are a case 
in point. (The perception experiments here referred to should not be 
confused with those conducted with psycho-physiological intentions in 
mind. These often seek to exclude or generalize beyond the cultural and 
situational influences on perceptions which are product semantics' main 
concern. ) 
Figure 4 
The second class of methods is gnticipatorv or interventive and 
seeks to extrapolate from known understanding of things the changes in 
understanding and practices a new design might introduce. People learn 
all the time and meanings rarely stay the same. It would be in the 
.' spirit of product semantics not to aim at a catalogue of available 
symbols or at a product language with a finite vocabulary but to develop 
instead a dvnamic theory of how symbols interact and change in meaning , 
how moti、ration can sustain the qrowth in users' understanding toward yet 
unanticipated practices , how whole user communities can come into being 
around emerqinq interface conventions. 
Anticipation requires extrapolation from existing knowledge and the 
theory here needed must be rooted in ç。qnition. learninq. social 
interactionL including the âvmbolic involvement of institutionâ (of 
production , communication and consumption). In work with 
RichardsonSmith , we have used cognitive theories of how metaphors , 
metonymies and cognitive prototypes work to anticipate the unfolding of 
user cognition. Learning theories also are available but rarely cast t。
shed light on how users might explore the complex affordances of a 
computer , for example. These anticipatory methods assure that proposed 
D.escripti.ve 
Accounts 
Components of Descriptive Methods 
Figure 4 
11 
affordances embrace not just the users ’ cognitive models currently 
available but also those that will unfold with practice. In the domain 
。f product semantics , anticipatory methods are recursive methods that 
change their own premise (the conditions that gave rise to the 
intervention in the first place) and are , I believe , unknown in 
engineering (the design of a bridge does not influence its underlying 
mechanics , physics or chemistry whereas the design of an interface 
inevitably changes the cognition it initially supports). 
Figure 5 
The third class of methods is creativ~ and intended to support 
informed design decisions , for example , on how semantic attributes come 
to be embodied in an artifact , how the ethnographies of particular 
þ' 
practices are converted into the affordances of a product , how verbal 
descriptions of an ideal type become translated into easily recognizable 
forms. with such more or less systematic techniques for realizing 
designers' intentions must come methods of testing the results for 
whether they do indeed solve the problem of understanding posed to begin 
with.--since this conference includes several papers on such methods I 
will conclude my triangulation of product semantics and come t。
appropriate theories. 
Figure 6 
Desian Theories for Product Semantics 
At this early stage of development , design theories for product 
semantics merely can provide conceptual systems capable of highlighting 
important areas of exploration , directing the acquisition of suitable 
knowledge , and guiding appropriate design decisions whose consequences 
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should turn back on and elaborate the very conceptual system that gave 
rise to it. 1 am proposing an embedded set of four such theories: 
focusing respectively on 브se ， 1.효끄g브효g르， gene흐후를 and 트으으L으gy of mind. 
But before 1 outline them , 1 wish to clarify their common root in 
understandina different oractices of interfacina with desianed obiects. 
Figure 7 
Understanding generally involves connecting experiences of 
different modalities to each other like walking on sand and seeing it or 
smelling something and knowing where one is. Qnderstandina thinas 
involves relatina them to their context of usg , to their practice , 
including to other things we are aware of. Artifacts take part in and 
well designed artifacts support circular enabling patterns involving our 
4ν 
actions on them , our perceptions of them and what we intend t。
accomplish through them. 
It is important to distinguish meaning and sense as two distinct 
manifestations of experiencing things. We say that ~。methina makes 
sense when we understand the role it olavs in a oarticular contex:t. when 
we have a satisfactory explanation of what it does. In contrast , the 
meaning of an object is the sum total of all the contexts for which 
someone is capable of imagining some sense for it. In short ~으꾀et뇨ing 
꾀르르E흐 (or enables someone to see or anticipate) its oossible contexts of 
브흐르 Thus ， by analogy , meaning is to sense as potentiality is t。
realization , as competence is to performance , as language is to speech. 
We acquire the meaning of something by generalizing to a range of 
contexts the variety of senses we could make of it in particular 
settings. 
Ecology 
Psychological Theory 
Socio-linguistic Theory 
4ν 
Techno-economic Theory 
Theory 9,.f Int~ractipfl 
among Species of Artifacts 
Contexts of Artifacts and Design Theories 
Figure 7 
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Meanings always are someone ’ s cognitive constructions and the 
artifacts that are thought to have them may not live up to them. We 
call the range of cognitive models or practices that something indeed 
can sustain its affordances. One c。이lld say that meanings are 
affordances as perceived by someone before they have been checked out in 
practice. 80 , a chair means sitting (among other meanings). If a 
comfortably looking chair is hard to sit on , it does not afford the 
kind of sitting it meant. If an icon on a computer screen suggests that 
clicking the mouse on it would "flip the screen" to the next "page" but 
does not invoke this change when tried , we say meanings and affordances 
mismatch. Product semantics aims at the desiqn of thinqs whose 
affordances cover at least the ranqe of meaninqs thev convev to users 
ι、
and all theories in product semantics could be said to concern 
relationships on two levels of understanding things , between meaning and 
affordances and between making sense and interface practice. 
As 1 said , in the old paradigm , errors largely were considered user 
errors and explanations for them were sought in the physiology of human 
performance , operator unreliabilities , incompetencies or lack of 
training and instructions. In the new paradigm ~rrors are considered as 
arisinq larqelv from an inabilitv to make sense. from a mismatQb of 
meaninqs and affordance~. Thus , the attribution of blame for such 
errors shifts from users to the designers who largely are responsible 
for the interfaces in which these errors arise. 
One should distinguish errors that instruct users on how something 
can be made to do what a user attempted and errors that lead t。
breakdowns of particular practices. product semantics makes controlled 
use of the first kind of errors by encouraging exploration without fear 
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。f making irreconci1ab1e mistakes , affording 1earning and se1f 
instruction. 1nstructive errors enab1e artifacts to worK~hemse1ves 
into existinq practices or generate new understandin。s. The second kind 
。 f errors 1eads users to a dead end , where he1p is needed but not 
provided. From the point of view of product semantics , comp1ex user 
manua1s for how to cope with breakdowns are not particu1ar1y user-
friend1y. They do not promote se1f-directed 1earning "on the f1y." 
Even occasiona1 breakdowns of practices disab1e artifacts to survive the 
c。ntexts in which thev mean to work. 
Thus , the four theories for product semantics 1 have been proposing 
basica11y specify X。ur essentia1 contexts in which artifacts shou1d not 
break down and need to survivg existing practices. Understanding , the 
’‘ re1ationship between meaning and sense , affordances and circu1ar 
enab1ing pattern of practice are common to a11 four contexts. Let me 
show how they 100k in each. 
The Context of Use 
Origina11y , product semantics was 1imited to solve problems of use 
and focussed attention to "the psychology of Everyday Things" (Donald A. 
Norman 1988). These are problems of making something immediately 
recognizable for what it is , often called self-evidence , problems of 
configuring something so that it can be hand1ed with well understood 
practices , so called semantic accomodation , and problems of natural 
acquisition of competence in use , also called self-instruction. Think 
about the prob1em of recognizing a fire extinguisher when needed and 
making its use clear , even under stress. Think about the frequent 
prob1em of arranging the switches of a four-burner stove so that it is 
。bvious which operates which. Think about the problem of designing a 
15 
single-lever control element for a shower that prevents users from being 
accidentally burned. Think about the problem of visually representing 
multi-dimensional data on a computer screen so that they may be 
understood and manipulated with such familiar concepts as files , piles 
。f documents , landscapes , desktops , tools , etc. 
A frequent failure to accommodate even rather simple user's 
conceptions is the design of hardware on ordinary double glass panel 
doors , largely used on modern office buildings in the U.S. with hinges 
skillfully hidden , one cannot make out in which direction they open. 
with the same handles used on both sides of a glass panel , users are 
given no indication whether to pull or push the door open. Moreover , 
with one of the doors occasionally locked , seeking to enter a building 
ends up requiring up to four embarrassing trials before accomplishing 
this most ordinary task. Two rather general solutions offer themselves 
in such situations. One is by employing 2hvsical constraintê., als。
called forcing functions , that restrict the user to only those options 
the device affords , like providing no handles to pull where a door needs 
pushing. The other is by using indicators that inform users about the 
。ptions available , like a visual indication of whether a door is or is 
not locked. 
To recognize what something is , to distinguish one artifact from 
another , research has shown that people approach objects with certain 
후의g효1- (also unfortunately called 2I으E으-) 흐YP.르득 in mind. We seem t。
judge first what we see in terms of its tvoicality (i.e. , the degree t。
which something is similar to known ideal types , and seek then t。
exolain how it differê. from the most similar type. When someone 
describes something as looking "like a telephone" then reference is made 
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to the ideal-type "telephone". When this person adds" but with more 
buttons ," the difference between what is seen and that ideal type 
becomes explained. In this typology of types , a still more basic kind 
is C.G. Jung ’ s 효프으뇨르후ygg which is thought to be housed deep in the 
collective unconscious , not realizable in any one object (even though 
some artists seek to approximate archetypes in their work) , but 
unconsciously entering the perception and evaluation of most things. 
As far as the design of meanings is concerned , we found it helpful 
to distinguish between geeostructures and actual manifestations of 
meanings. Just as there are many different ways of expressing a thought 
so there are many different ways of making a deepstructure manifest in 
something. Keeping in mind that the meanings of artifacts equals the 
range 。f imagined c。ntexts 。f use , a deepstructure ir 껴ist" is 
generalized from these contexts , skeletal and primary , whereas its 
manifestation is concrete , detailed and secondary to users. For most 
people , a book is first or foremost something to read irrespective of 
its size , binding , cover , typeface and content , which are necessary 
characteristics of any book. Manifestations may convey irrelevant or 
accidental meanings that can distract from the intended practice. The 
fact that a book can also be used to profit from sales , to support the 
short leg of a table , to exhibit one ’ s interest in a certain topic , t。
conceal a document or money is accidental. 
To account for the understanding that underlies actual interface 
practices , .\!sers ’ cocmitive model~ have become central concepts in 
product semantics. Out of different experiences with using things , 
people tend to develop a kind of operational logic for why things work 
the way they appear and how they can be controlled or manipulated 
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towards desired practices. These models can usually be constructed from 
the verbal explanations users give of their own behavior , protocols , 
transcripts of exchanges , etc. Construction of such models provides 
designers with a reference in terms of which the affordances of a 
product and the meanings it has to different user groups may be 
assessed. 
Interfacing with something requires that cognitive models 
complement the behavior they "model" in a circular enabling pattern of 
action , perception and e、raluation (see Figure 2). This requires 도후엔ely 
and informationallv adeauate feedback ab。이lt whether an action is 
accepted by a machine , what its internal states are and which options 
are available for future actions. A soundless keyboard for computers 
seems a great idea but because users then can n。 l。ager kn。w whether a 
command is entered , this causes uncertainty and invites errors. 
Switches whose direction tell users whether the power is on or off 
provide feedback that pushbuttons may not. Moreover and closer to the 
effects , feedback on whether , for example , a motor actually is running 
may be more important for taking a next step than the knowledge of 
whether a switch is on or off. The best interface designs immediately 
show what the system is doing but only as much as is relevant for the 
cognitive models in use. The absence of feedback can leave a user 
uncertain and guessing and irrelevant feedback may be confusing. 
To design something for non-habitual use , i.e. , for users wh。
expand their understanding to new practices , requires an appreciation of 
the dynamics of cognition. Two approaches have been found productive of 
such understanding. One is based on the fact that people differ in 호뇨르 
wav thev exolore their worldê , the errors they are willing to risk when 
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trying out a new practice , the amount of feedback information they feel 
is needed before acting , etc. Some users require logical transparency , 
。thers are willing to muddle through , still others need other persons t。
explain what they need to know. Designs shou1d support all of these 
strategies of exploration without causing a total breakdown of 
practices. The other approach is based on a ç。nception of mind that 
recoanizes metaphors and metonomies to be central processelè by which 
people extend their understanding to unfamiliar objects and practices. 
Metaphors are processes by which patterns from a familiar domain , are 
used to organize something in another and unfamiliar domain , metonomies 
are processes of generalizing from familiar parts to the organization of 
unfamiliar wholes. Metaphors and metonomies can often be embodied 
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visually and then support users' understanding withóut or with only few 
trials and errors. 
Human cognition never is fixed (contrary to how we tend t。
conceptualize the structure of machines). The continuous expansion of 
practices of interfacing to new and perhaps better things drives not 
。nly ordinary users but also designers who , to be honest to themselves , 
。ught to design products whose meanings do afford the very cognitive 
dynamics they themselves cherish. 
The final concept I wish to mention in conjunction with use is 
motivation , that what sustains the practice of interfacing with designed 
things. We distinguish between internal motivati。n ， which may be 
derived from play , from feelings of belonging , balance and coherence , or 
from acquired aesthetic sensibilities , and gxternal motivati。n ， which 
is derived from the anticipation of goal achievement. Some motivation 
is necessary for an artifact to enter a context and be used there. But 
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this motivation is not limited to instrumentality which functionalists 
do assume. 
Although the context of use indeed has been of primary concern for 
many designers , there are still three more contexts in which artifacts 
need to survive in practice. 
The Context of Lanauaae 
Designers usually underestimate the extent to which the meanings of 
。bjects arise with language use and crucially depend on non-users. 
There almost always are bystanders , judges , clients , reference groups or 
whole institutions who participate in the individual use of things by 
c。mmunicatina about the!!). These "third parties" actively influence if 
not determine what something is , how it is to be us용d ， who may use it 
and what value is placed on its possession. Moreover , the structure of 
the linguistic expressions used in this process has much to do with how 
the designed environment is being organized and intevened with. One can 
say that 。biects are constituted in lanauaae. participate in 
interpersonal relationships throuah lanauaae. become built into social 
realities bv lanaua。~ and therefore must prove themselves viable in 
human communication , often before they enter a particular practice. 
1 might add that language is not only gescriptive or referential as 
traditional semioticians assume , instructiv~ or persuasive as 
rhetoricians insist , but can also be ç。nstitutive of social reality as 
Austin began to see. A priests' statement "1 pronounce you hereby 
married" has no truth value by correspondence but 피효뇨르를 the man a 
husband and the woman a wife. Khomeini ’ s mere declaration of 및뇨g 
Satanic Verseê as a blasphemy makes it so and 으효브흐르흐 numerous rather 
real violent acts. Attributes that are publically associated with 
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particular classes of products whether through advertising , rumors or 
hands-on experiences enter individual perceptions and actions in 
profound ways. For example , products that can easily be made fun of are 
rarely sold and there are numerous examples where jokes drove a product 
。ut of the marketplace. When bargaining over their price , artifacts 
become exchange objects. When placed in a museum and reproduced in an 
exhibition catalogue , products become celebrated art objects and as a 
gift , products can bring people together , etc. Things that are named 
the same are easily confused in practice. All of these examples rely on 
a constitutive use of language (which is one of the cornerstones of an 
emerging cybernetic epistemology). since language defines and helps 
weaving artifacts into social practices , artifacts must not only be 
physically useful but also ~urvive the s。ci。-linqui￡tic c。ntext as well. 
The need for artifacts to survive in language use starts already at 
the design phase. Designers receive their assignments in linguistic 
forms--ranging from vague notions of client ’ s desires to formal 
contracts , including the design specifications to be met. Designers 
argue among themselves , make presentations to clients and are well aware 
that the models and proposals they develop have to withstand the 
judgement of critics and overcome numerous barriers to realization all 
。f which are largely subjected to arguments. Things that cannot be 
described can hardly be designed , are impossible to produce 
industrially , are unlikely to be used and are therefore largely non-
existent. Design activities are to no small measures communication 
activities , aimed at a consensus among all those concerned on what a 
product should be for or mean to potential users. An understanding of 
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the 1anguage used in design processes therefore is indispensable for 
understanding of the reality it constitutes. 
There are innumerable examples of how the structure of spoken 
language is implicated in how we conceptualize , design , see and 
manipulate things. For example , the linear subject-verb-object 
constructions in English probably are responsible for thinking in terms 
。 f instrumental action-actor-target sequences , functions and the like. 
They also account for designing computer interfaces in terms of (visual) 
。bjects and actions to move , transform , create or dispose of (file or 
erase from memory) , for the use of signs for what controls are for , and 
for giving how-to-instructions to users. Such linguistic constructions 
give evidence for the existence of deepstructures for understanding 
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artifacts not just for designers but for users as well. 
For another example , consider adjective-noun constructions. 
Adjectival forms serve as natural models for perceiving products as 
D。ssessin。 certain semantic qualities , attributes , characters , meanings 
that classify or order them accordingly. Reinhart Butter ’ s method of 
translating a set of semantic attributes into the visual manifestations 
。 f a product is based on these constructions , as is Charles Odgood ’ s 
semantic differential that has been used to evaluate the success of such 
translations. The Lannochs ’ proposal for a method of semantic transfer 
similarly starts with adjectives along qualitative dimensions of what 
they call a semantical space and proceeds to locate a product within 
that space. It is important to note that most of the adjectival 
constructions and several dimensions of Lannoch ’ s semantical space makes 
reference to a user , a speaker , relative to whom experiences , 
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。rientations ， comparisons , affordances , etc. are expressed which makes 
this notion of space fundamentally different from geometry. 
At the users end , language is implicated in negotiating the 
emotional , social and political meanings of products and the practices 
afforded by them. For example , virtually all objects someone acquires 
。r choses to surround him or herself with can become expressive of that 
someone ’ s individual identity. The brand of car driven , the artwork 
collected , the style of dressing or furniture arrangements , all 
participate more prominently in interpersonal communication than in 
physical use. Products can bec。αne conventional symbols of social 
differentiation , integration or status and enter conversations in this 
capacity , thus giving material support for social relationship that are 
’‘ largely created and maintained through language. 
A linguistic theory for product semantics must therefore capture 
those interactions through which distinctions , definitions , social 
identifications and differentiations of meanings are negotiated , through 
which products become incorporated in the larger system of artifacts and 
through which objects participate in human communication. without the 
ability of being expressed in language , the meanings of designed objects 
cannot be shared and ignoring the role of language in designing things 
may produce functional , but socially useless devices. 
The Context of Genesis 
For designers , objects have other meanings as well. These result 
generally from their role in the continuous material reproduction of 
culture and specifically from guiding artifacts through the web of 
processes of production , dissemination , consumption , use , and 
retirement. 
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The context of genesis essentially consists of a complex process , a 
process characterizable in terms of communication , that connects 
designers , producers , bankers , engineers , advertisers , retailors , sales 
persons , buyers , consumers or users , market researchers , recyclers , 
etc. , into a huge circular network which brings about the transformation 
。 f material culture. within such a production-consumption network 
。bjects may be seen as temporarily frozen patterns , gestalts , forms or 
messages that invite participantion and suggests appropriate responses 
transforming them into another medium or passing them on to others. 
When such a succession of transformations comes back to where it 
started , applies to its own transforms , learning can take place within 
the network. Indeed , designers never do create industrial products but 
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models , renderings and presentations or communications that must make 
sense to clients so that they can do something with them. Drawings must 
be specific enough to guide production engineers to design appropriate 
tools and product managers to design appropriate marketing research and 
implementation strategies. For bankers , production plans must make 
sense financially. For sales persons , products must communicate their 
potential for profit as incentives for selling them and for users , 
products must communicate their affordances as incentives for fitting 
them into their practice of living , etc. 
The word "successful" derives from "succession" and to be 
successful in the context of genesis , ~ nroduct ide~ and any pattern 
that derives from it must be able to nave its own wav throuqh the 
rletwork of nroduction and consumpti。ß. This implies that it must be 
meaningful to everyone involved and at every stage of the genetic 
process clearly express where it comes from , what can be done with it 
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how and why , and where it might go next. In this context , design 
processes result in communications that resemble addressed messages 
which inform a great number of receivers of opportunities and incentives 
and include a recursively embedded sequence of similar messages 
addressed to successive receivers , ultimately leading to where designers 
want their message to go before something comes back. The process is a 
process of communication but not between one sender and one receiver 
through an established channel. Messages here create their own channels 
as they are passed along. 
Designers rarely do entirely ignore the semantics involved in 
genesis. All have at least some idea of where they want to go with what 
they do. But , designing products with an eye on prestigious design 
awards or important publications on the one extreme or assuming the role 
。 f frustrated advocates of a certain formal style against industrial 
interests on the other , does not reveal much depth in understanding the 
semantics that drives the complex network of production and consumption. 
Often the understanding of the semantics involved is only partial , 
for example , when designers leave their ideas unexplained to the seeming 
arbitrary interpretation by clients and then become frustrated about 
what becomes of them. Often the understanding of the semantics involved 
serves some interest more so than others , for example , the design of 
corporate styles that convey to users the source of a product with the 
hope of creating commitments to buy a whole family of products from the 
same source (having little to do with actual use). Often the 
understanding of the semantics involved does not govern the whole 
process , for example , witness the plight of ecologically minded 
designers to support the development of products that are either 
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biodegradable , 1。이~ in entropy or contain instructions on how to recycle 
them after retirement. The lack of knowledge on how to direct such 
processes reveals industrial blind spots in the production and 
consumption cycle. Only 띤낀en ihe desianers' messaaes either oass throuah 
。r aenerate comolete circular chains are desianers able to make adeauate 
sense of their own activitie~. (This is of course true for all the 
participants in a network of production and consumption for a circle has 
neither beginning nor end). A design theory for product semantics in 
the context of genesis therefore describes the network of production and 
consumption as a communication process that attributes to all 
participants , including designers , the possibility of understanding , 
creating and taking responsibility for their own contributions t。
material culture. 
The Ecoloaical Context 
The fourth and last design theory for product semantics 1 have been 
proposing pertains to the meanings of objects in an ecological 
framework. Design theory in this context is again structurally 
different from the previous ones. Let me explain. 
In biology , ecology is concerned with the interaction of large 
populations of species of animals , plants , minerals within their 
respective environments. It seeks to understand the dynamics arising 
from species feeding on each other , like the population of foxes feeding 
。n the population of rabbits and achieve dynamic equilibrium conditions. 
It tries to understand how species move into niches , replace others 
already there and defend their "territories" against possible intruders. 
Ecology also studies a variety of relationships that emerge in such 
interaction , for example cooperation , competition , parasitism , 
26 
symbiosis. 1 have been following Kenneth Bouldings suggestion to extend 
the biological notion of ecology to species of artifacts such as cars , 
bricks , appliances , microchips , telephones , furniture , copy machines and 
watches , all of which are designed and mass produced , and road systems , 
cities , constitutions and social organizations which are artifacts as 
well but may be said to have a natural history of their own. 
Thus conceived , ecology should not be confused with a conservative 
attitude toward nature. Keeping pollution of our environment to a 
minimum , preserving the habitats of endangered species , recycling what 
was heretofore discarded as waste are important concerns in the domain 
。f a design theory for genesis. Theory in ecology elucidates what 
happens to large populations of species in interaction. 
Let me mention a few issues that ecological theories for product 
semantics need to embrace. 
Firstly , designers who may have the design of a particular product 
in mind might ask themselves why should they be concerned with how 
different population of species of artifacts interact , why should they 
be taking a global perspective when local action seems to be called for? 
The answer to such legitimate questions is that no one can really 
prevent several species of artifacts from getting involved in a variety 
。f relationships that constitute whole systems and confine their 
particular members (including designers) as well. For example , 
artifacts compete in the sense that an increase in numbers of one kind 
decreases the numbers of another. This was the case between horses and 
automobiles until horses found a niche which cars cannot penetrate. 
competition is still ongoing between typewriters and computers , between 
film and video cameras for home use , etc. The use of quills for writing 
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has virtually died out. Quills now exist in the context of museums 
where they are no longer used the way they were. We can also observe 
symbiosis among artifacts , for example , between computers , software , 
mathematics , telephone networks , etc. which bring their numbers in 
positivecorrelation , support each other ’ s viability and form larger 
cultural complexes that can engage in competitive , cooperative , 
parasitical and dominance relationships with others as wholes. 
Styles , functional complementarities and combinational 
compatibilities also can become major attractors that bring artifacts 
together. For example , such rather different objects like forks , 
plates , glasses , napkins have developed family resemblances and are kept 
together in most households just as rather different art objects from a 
particular culture , period or style are likely to find themselves 
exhibited (or used) in the same locale. Even if their concern is just 
another product , designers always contribute to ecological interactions 
。 f this kind by varying a form , creating similarities and differences , 
carrying technology from one domain to another , materially supporting a 
modern practice over a traditional one , etc. Yes , designers must act 
locally but the ability to assume responsibilities for such actions 
requires taking larger perspectives. ßn ecoloav with artifacts is the 
m。st alobal oersoective and entails the most imoortant resoonsibilities 
a desianer can assume. 
Secondly , while an ecology always is self-organizing , allowing n。
single species to be in charge of all others (not to be confused with 
the possibility of dominance relationships) and in fact making it 
impossible for any one participant to understand the whole , there is a 
crucial difference between an ecology with and an ecology without 
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artifacts. In biology , organisms fend for themselves and a pre-
technological ecology comes about because there is such a great variety 
。 f them , including humans , that do this so well. Artifacts , on the 
。ther hand , are man-made , participate in the ecology in important ways 
but never without a multitude of human brains putting them in place and 
keeping them in motion. The difference between an ecology with and one 
without artifacts is 믿르효ning ， which seems to me the most imnortant 
。raanizina nrincinle of ecoloaical interacti。n between objects. When 1 
said the horse had been pushed into a niche where cars can't enter , and 
remembering that meaning equals the set of contexts in which something 
makes sense , 1 also could have said that the horse acquired unique 
meanings no longer shared by cars (and other forms of transportation). 
The radio has not just changed in numbers relative to television sets 
but as a consequence of this competition acquired special meanings 
unknown 50 years ago. In an ecology , the meanings of whole classes of 
artifacts are constituted relative to all other artifacts they compete , 
cooperate or interact with. It is our collective conception of what 
they all have to do with each other that makes us making them interact. 
In this context , we thus go beyond use , language , production and 
consumption and become concerned with what forms dynamic systems of 
symbolic entities. Underlying this is the fact that Ne alwavs make sense 
。 f our nractice with thinqs but. as we qeneralize these experiences t。
the meaninqs of thinqs and applv these meaninqs as quides for our 
practice of livinq with thinqs. we inevitably orqanize the ecoloqy that 
surrounds u~. Thus meanings , the symbolic qualities we attribute t。
。bjects relative to each other are the key to understanding the ecology 
。 f our own cognitively constructed world. 
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Thirdly , designers are not only 2효ζ호 。f an ecology with artifacts 
(just as all , including humans organisms , participate ecologically) , 
since meanings provide the fundamental organizing principle of 
artifacts' ecological participation , the designers ’ understanding of 
artifacts becomes part of the very ecology it brings about. Whereas 
design theories for the context of use , language and genesis could be 
formulated from a position 。이ltside their respective empirical domains by 
uninvolved observers , so to speak , sn ecoloqical desiqn theorv is part 
。f the verv ecoloav it describeê , must be constructed inside its own 
domain and while design , as an intervention in the practice of living , 
is being practiced. This self-reference constitutionally involves the 
designers' own understanding , including of themselves. ~esiqn theories 
in the context of ecoloqy can therefore be said to be theories of 
desicmers ’ ming and practice. 
Figure 8 
But back to the role of meanings in an ecology. Some cultural 
anthropologists have long seen the artifacts we create as the medium 
through which cultural identities are preserved and communicated t。
subsequent generations. Others have gone so far as to equate culture 
with the artifacts a society uses. It is the idea of product semantics 
that has forced us to become more specific in this regard and t。
identify the cognitive processes that enable designers to create things 
that are meaningful to others , things that people can use , talk about 
and assemble into lager complexes , things that enable design practice t。
be distributed and become part of everyday life (not monopolized by a 
select few) , things that center individuals in an individually 
} } 
‘ 
Culture 
Society 
Community 
CM = Cognitive Model 
CMof 
Use 
CMof 
Ecology Mythology 
Participants in Genesis 
Multi-species Interaction 
Processes in an Ecology of Designers' Mind 
Figure 8 
30 
meaningful but constantly evolving world. The design theories of 
product semantics 1 have sketched so far are manifestations of different 
levels of an ecology of designers' mind. 
Mythology probably is the most important and unconsciously 
embracing governing structure in an ecology with artifacts. C.G. Jung 
pointed this out long ago but applied his insight to psychoanalysis 
。nly. A culture can hardly be conceived without myths either and the 
vitality of its continuous reproduction , the ecology of its meanings , 
derives directly from them. In some cultures mythology is embodied in 
ritual performances and communicated through stories of supernatural 
beings and Gods who interact with each other , and perform deeds of 
immense power. Such stories often serve as examples of how humans 
interact with each other and through the artifacts of their own 
creation. In the industrialized West , mythology has become more 
suppressed , unconscious and implicit in superstitious beliefs , in 
routine cultural practices , in literature and entertainment but it 
。ccasionally surfaces rather concretely whether in starwars (the movie 
and the defense system) , in the idea of intelligent machines (in science 
fiction and in the design of computers and robots) and in the need t。
feel one with others (whether by telephone connections or by 
participation in the mass media). Mythologies give coherence to large 
cultural ecologies , complexes that no single individual can understand 
much less design in its detail , assign all participating things 
meaningful roles and direct them to interact in ways that have developed 
。ver centuries of human social existence. Design strategies that g。
against ancient that ecological wisdom are likely to fail. 
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In his analysis of Gandhi's use of various objects , S.Balaram has 
pointed out , that artifacts symbolically mediate between the deep-
rooted , often unconscious and relatively stable mythological heritage of 
a culture and the relatively fast changing socio-economical contexts of 
everyday life. with the support by powerful mythologies , artifacts can 
gain considerable ecological strength and introduce meaning and 
centeredness into everyones life. Whether through designers ’ ignorance 
。r preference , for example , for a functionalism that cannot cope with 
meanings at all or for a semiotics of reference that create pathologies 
in design , the lack of support by existing mythologies can produce an 
inhuman technology that destroys the larger message that culture is. 
Figure 9 
Only when designers are able to see themselves as part of the larger 
system of meanings , an ecology that guides the creation and use of 
artifacts , changes the material world including their own understanding 
。f it , can designers assume responsibilities for their own ecological 
interventions , which ultimately are interventions into their own 
practices of living. On the level of ecology , product semantics seeks 
to establish the kind of symbolic resonance between the mythological 
heritage of a culture (or whatever the modern equivalent may be called) 
and the material support through which practices of living become 
meaningful and keep human users of artifacts centered and alive. 
Whoever realizes such connections also centers and vitalizes his or her 
。wn ecology of mind. Such aims of product semantics provide a wholely 
new outlook in design. 
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